Want to get inside my head at the felt? Here’s your chance! From time to time, I will post an interesting, pivotal, or just plain fun hand from my recent play. I will provide as much analysis on the hand as I can, from what I was thinking at the time, to what I think of the play now, and will I do anything differently moving forward. I make no declaration of being a poker expert, and I’m sure that many of you will just flat ask why I would even play some of the hands that I will dissect. That’s totally cool. I just enjoy talking about hand dynamics: good, bad, and everything in between. But beware, once you’re in, you may never get out!
Anatomy of a Punt
All too often when players bust out of a tournament they talk about how they got sucked out on, or they lost a flip. This past weekend at the Running Aces Big Stack Avalanche I busted 3 shy of the money, and it was not a bad beat. I made several mistakes in a hand that played WAY bigger than was necessary and thought you all might like to enjoy reading about my mistakes…
Level 18 1/3/6k blinds, 8 handed, 32 players remain, 27 paid. First hand back from break, I’m the small blind with 320k. Action folds to the button, Nick Olson who finished the tournament in 10th, who raises to 14k out of his 260k stack. I had played with Nick for over half of my Day 1, and we had been at the same table all of Day 2. Prior to this event, I do not recall having played with him at all. My impressions of him were that he is a fairly decent rec player, doesn’t get out of line too much, bets his hands, folds draws to pressure, avoids big pots versus perceived stronger opponents. On Day 1 we were on opposite ends of the table and I was able to really watch how he was playing but didn’t really get to talk to him much. On Day 2, sitting next to one another, we had a lot of opportunity to talk poker, our poker history, and my feeling about his game became reinforced. For the most part, Nick didn’t really engage with me unless he had a REALLY big hand, this will be important to remember.
When Nick raises to 14k it raised my interest a little bit. Up until that point, Nick had been opening for 3x and higher, even when folded to him on the button. The fact that he only raised this time to 2.33x should’ve had me thinking MORE about what was different about his range this time. Unfortunately I didn’t. Instead I just looked at my holdings expecting to throw away weak cards, or 3 bet with a strong hand. I looked at the [9c][7c] and thought: “he’s only been playing big hands against me, this hand can flop really well, and if it does, I can probably bust him” so I just called and the big blind folded. This was another missed opportunity to change how the hand played. Missing the change in bet sizing didn’t alarm me as much as it should’ve. If it had, and I had taken the time to think about what it meant, this would’ve been a great spot for me to 3 bet out of position. His lower opening bet size means one of two things: he either has an extremely big hand that he wants to get value out of so he lowers the bet size to entice the blinds in, or his holding is weaker than normal and he wants to minimize his exposure while still playing with the advantage of having position. If I 3 bet here, yes I may be giving up some equity with a hand that can flop well, but it forces a less experienced opponent to define his range against me, making any future decisions easier.
So with 42k in the pot we see a flop of [7s][9s][8c]. The order of these shouldn’t matter, but in this case it does as it plays in to more of my mistakes. As the flop was being spread from left to right, Nick is in the 1 seat, I am in the 2 seat, the door card is the [7s]. Normally I don’t watch a flop as it comes out, I like to watch my opponent, but for some reason I watched the flop. As soon as the 7 registered in my brain I started thinking about how the next card could affect how big my hand had become and that as long as the cards weren’t broadway cards, I was going to have a hammerlock on the hand. As the [9s] was revealed, my brain instantly thought “I am going to bust him as long as there is not a 3rd spade”. The final [8c] registered in my head as a non threatening card. WHAT?!?! While yes I flopped 2 pair with a back door flush, the 8 should’ve screamed at me to proceed with caution. Instead, all that registered was that it wasn’t a spade, and it gave me the back door flush. I was giddy to check so that I could raise over the expected c-bet, which Nick obliged with of 24k. I continued to play the hand poorly by not thinking about anything other than he probably was c-betting with either an overpair or a big flush draw. I had already determined that I was going to raise when he bet, but I hadn’t considered how much yet, now I started to think about it, but not as much as I should have. I had a brief thought of just calling the bet to ensure no flush card hit the turn, but at this point, all I was concerned with was how I was going to get him to commit all of his chips. I thought if I shoved, he was going to fold, so I needed to raise an amount that looked like I was pushing a flush draw if he had an overpair, or if he had the flush draw with overs combo, would entice him to try and shove me out. I settled on 84k into the 66k pot. My opponent quickly shoved, and since that is what I was hoping for, I snap called. He flipped over the [10h][6s]. OOPS! The board did not improve my hand, but the runout is worth mentioning as it will help shape further discussion. The [8s] turn definitely would have slowed me down if I had just called the flop bet. I don’t exactly remember the river card, but I believe it was the [Kh], I know it was a red face card though, which again would’ve kept me from committing a bunch of chips.
So, there is SOOOOO much wrong with this hand, much of which I have already touched on briefly, but I want to recap all of it and the easiest way to do that I think is to list the mistakes in chronological order…
- Pay attention. At the beginning of the hand I had been in a conversation spilling over from the break and wasn’t really paying attention to the action. Following along as everybody folded wouldn’t have necessarily changed much of my analysis, but it would’ve gotten my mind in the right place to actually DO the analysis. Instead, I just payed attention when it was my turn to act, barely registering the change in my opponent’s opening bet sizing, then making incomplete and poor assumptions about what it meant.
- Pre-flop call. It’s not the worst decision, but I also believe it was not the optimal decision. All too often players are too passive from the blinds when defending, and I had a prime spot to 3-bet out of position when defending that would’ve completely changed the dynamics of the hand. While some may argue that I am taking a revisionist approach to this since I now know that my opponent’s hand wasn’t all that strong, his bet sizing change should’ve alerted me to something being different. I think one of the best ways for me to determine what my opponent is doing in this spot is to put the pressure back on them. If he has a really strong hand, I am going to get 4 bet. While I don’t really want to throw my hand away to a 4 bet since it has some really good value, the sizing of my opponent’s bet at that point could dictate wether or not I would be getting the proper odds to see a flop or not. Also, prior to this hand, I had only really 3 bet pre-flop with some giant hands, and had them shown. Because of this, and the potential that my opponent could’ve been getting a little out of line, the 3 bet is going to force a lot of folds, allowing me to pick up some free chips. If my opponent just calls, I don’t really pick up too much more information, but I have essentially taken over control of the pot from out of position and can proceed from a much stronger vantage than if I just called.
- Did I mention PAY ATTENTION?!? Clearly my mind wasn’t quite ready to play the hand properly, and it manifested itself in the worst way by how I behaved when the flop came out. As played (by just calling) it is imperative for me to observe my opponent, not the cards. I have no idea if my opponent gave away a tell when the flop came out, but I had observed some things from him previously, so my gut tells me that he probably would’ve given something away here too. Just as important though, since I did watch the flop, I should’ve taken the time to completely analyze it. While I had flopped 2 pair, I completely discounted all the straights, they didn’t even register in my head. I fell in to a trap that many players often do and just got excited about what I had, not what others could potentially have. Even with the prior mistakes, disaster still could’ve been avoided here if I had just taken the time to truly understand the flop, I mean, can a flop really be any more wet than 3 straight cards, with 2 flush cards, right in the middle?
- The check. Again, I don’t completely hate the check as opposed to a done bet here, it’s more my thought process around it. The only thing I was thinking about at that point was hoping my opponent would c-bet so I could raise and potentially play for stacks. It’s always better to have a strategy for future action, but I was extremely narrow casting.
- Lack of evaluating my opponent’s c-bet. I already described how I didn’t think about his bet because he did exactly what I wanted him too, thus allowing me to continue with my plan. The error though was not taking the time to analyze the bet first to ensure that I was really getting what I wanted. Prior to this hand, when my opponent had a strong hand on the flop, his c-bets were around half pot, while his weaker hands tended tone a little lighter. Here we were gain with him making a c-bet that was just over half pot, and the only thing I considered was that he had an overpair, or a big spade draw. Neglecting to notice that as the hand played, it was VERY possible for my opponent to have [Jx][10x] or [5x][6x], though I probably wouldn’t have thought about his actual [10x][6x] combo. If I had taken the time to think through his c-bet, I definitely would’ve considered a flopped straight in his range, not to mention a flopped set of 8s, and could’ve just called the c-bet.
- Check raise bet sizing. While there is definitely a lot of mistakes already, the biggest here may be the size of my check raise. With my opponent’s c-bet, the pot has grown to 66k, or 11 big blinds. The pot was already getting big, and without a complete strangle hold on the hand, I shouldn’t have been too excited to bloat it further. I can comfortably call for 4 big blinds, making the pot 15bb total, and see what develops on the turn. The only thing I was really worried about hitting the turn was a spade, but there are so many cards that could come on the turn that could’ve potentially snapped me out of whatever psychological trance that I was in. The fact that the turn was the actual gin card that absolutely would’ve changed my perspective just hammers home the mistake. Instead, I raise to 14bb, bloating the pot to 25bb, and almost too juicy for me to fold regardless of what my opponent has. My over bet sealed my fate of playing for stacks in a spot where I had grossly under analyzed if I really wanted to or not.
- Snap calling the all-in. Again here I was blinded by the fact that my opponent did exactly what I wanted him to do. Never once did I consider what other possible hands he could have here other than what I put him on. Even though the pot was a juicy size for me to actually fold 2 pair, the board was just too wet. Also, even though the pot was a very good size, I had really only committed 16.33bb out of my 53.33bb stack. The structure of this tournament, and the relative closeness of the bubble should’ve dictated playing a much smaller pot here. I really committed ICM suicide here.
This isn’t a complete analysis as I know that there were things I was thinking in my head while typing this that didn’t quite make it in, but I really wanted to post some thoughts about this hand, and I felt I have already rambled on too long. I feel that it is important for me, and for anyone else that plays this game with some seriousness, to really take a hard look at analyzing their plays. Sure I could just say I got really unlucky in this spot to flop 2 pair while my opponent flopped a straight, but there was really so much more to this hand that could’ve changed the eventual outcome. All too often in the poker world, we hear about how someone busted out in what appeared to be a punt situation, but we don’t really get a deeper understanding of what they were thinking that caused it. I’m sharing one of my punting scenarios here to help others avoid the same mistake, and maybe, just maybe, help me avoid doing the same thing in the future.
It has been nearly a year since I posted a hand to this page, which is not what I was hoping for this page. So, hopefully I will start posting more regularly, but because it has been so long, here are 3 hands that I think are somewhat interesting. I don’t know the complete specifics anymore, like exact stack sizes, but I remember them enough to get the points across.
Hand 1: The Call
This is from the Running Aces Anniversary tournament from earlier this month. It is from Day 1, blinds 400/800 100 ante.
I had been at the same table for the whole day, and it was one of the worst table draws I’ve had in a long time. Not because it was full of tough players, that would’ve been better. It was full of very tight players that didn’t really want to play pots, unless they had strong hands. While this makes reads very simple, it makes chip accumulation very difficult. I had a stack of about 40k from the 15k starting stack, mostly just from taking the blinds and continuation betting.
I am under the gun plus 2, I look down at [Ad][10h] and raise to 1700. The table folds to the blinds, both of which call. The SB has about 50k, while the BB has about 20k. Flop comes [2d][3h][5d]. Not the best flop for my hand against the two blinds, but it could be worse. Both of the blinds check to me. I could CB again here as I had been doing all day, but the SB had gotten most of his chips from big check raises when he flopped sets versus big pairs, and I didn’t want to expose myself to a big check raise when there were a lot of cards that could come on the turn to improve my hand, so I checked. Turn is [10d], bingo! Now I have top top with the nut flush draw. SB checks and the BB fires 2200. This now means that the BB has committed roughly 20% of his stack to this hand. He had been playing very tight, so I need to respect his bet. It is quite possible that he just made the flush, or that he flopped the straight. He could also just have a large 10, or had flopped a set. Because I respect his tightness, I choose to just flat his bet, rather than raise. I also had felt that he would define his hand on the river. If he had a hand that could beat me, he would lead out, if he only had a big 10, I felt he would check call a value bet. To my surprise, the SB tanked for about 2 minutes, the raised to 5300. As I had mentioned before, he had gotten most of his stack from check raising with small sets. In each of those instances, he had tanked before raising, just as he had this time. However; each of the previous times, his tank had lasted so long that I felt I should call the clock on him, even though I wasn’t involved in the hand. In reality, I haven’t ever called the clock on someone, and I would never do it when I am not in the hand, but I do get to a point when I think the clock should be called. This time, I didn’t get to that point, so I didn’t think he was as strong as he had been in the past. His check raise did cause the BB to fold, which now meant I could finish this hand heads-up. Again, thinking that he wasn’t as strong as he was previously, odds are that I was ahead. Plus if I was wrong, I could get bailed out by a diamond on the river that doesn’t pair the board. I decided to call, and figure out the right move on the river. River brings the [5c]. Not exactly the best card for me. I don’t hit the flush, if he did have a set again, now he has a boat. Really the only good thing about that card is it is unlikely to have improved his hand if I had been ahead on the turn. About 10 seconds after the river card hits, he fires 7800. I took some time to replay the hand, and his previous plays, in my head. While he had made his stack off of check raises, I didn’t really picture him as the type of guy that would check the turn when he didn’t get the action that a flopped set would’ve liked. I also don’t think that he would’ve check raised the turn holding a flopped set since there was now a flush out there. I really only thought that he would check raise the turn if he was holding the flush, or had turned top set, which was unlikely given the action and me holding [10h]. Both of those options though have me crushed, and the river didn’t bail me out. What eventually led me to make the call was the difference in timing of his bets. Part of what I had to figure out was if the time difference I sensed was different or not. The previous hands that he tank check raised on, I was not involved in, this one I was. Sometimes the time it takes for people to act feels different based on whether or not you are invested in the decision. Luckily for me, I was facing one of the tournament clocks, and had kept track of how much time had passed on his previous decisions, and when he check raised this turn. The final piece of the puzzle was his quick river bet. Often when a player is on a flush draw, they fire a large bet in quick fashion on the river, trying to look strong. Based on all of these things, I decided to call. I could’ve raised, but just in case I was wrong, I didn’t want to commit tournament suicide. Upon calling, the gentleman proclaimed “ship it” and threw his cards face up on the table in front of me. To my delight, they were [10c][Kd] J
Hand 2: The Luckbox
This hand, and the next one are both from the final table of a 30 person tournament that I won 7/21/2014. The field is made up of 30 solid tournament players from the Twin Cities. We will be gathering once a month for 12 months, playing in a league for cash to the top 3 each night, as well as WSOP seats for the top point winners in each quarter, and for the year. Pretty much everyone in the tournament has played with one another on several occasions. The final table of 10 consisted of 5 members from Team Poker Joker including myself, Chris Belflower, Heidi Roggenkamp, “Minnesota” Molly Mossey, and Rob Brereton. Rob had nearly 200k in chips, with Molly not far behind him. Thankfully both of them were on my left as I came in with only about 40k. I had been able to build my stack up to about 60k with blinds of 1000/2000 and 500 ante when the following hand occurred between Chris & I.
I was under the gun plus 2 and looked down at [2s][4s]. While many at the table know that I am capable of playing any 2 cards from any position, I had still been able to pull off a big bluff shortly before the final table with 2/4os, and thought it might be fun to play a pot again. Plus, because everyone knows my style so well, me raising from early position will almost assuredly force others to define their hands. If I face a large 3 bet, it’s easy for me to fold. If I get a couple callers, I’m comfortable playing post flop, win or lose. I decide to open to 6000. The 3x raise is a bit bigger than normal, but again this is to force players to define their hands. Most of the players would be astute enough to notice that I had just committed about 10% of my stack, so they would be less likely to get in there with me with weak holdings. What I had failed to realize is that Chris’ stack had shrunk to only 16k directly on my left. After my raise, he instantly shipped his stack, and the entire table folded to me. Now, normally calling an all-in with 2/4 is not the wisest thing in the world, but I still took a moment to think it through. Even though I had failed to realize how small Chris’ stack had gotten, I was able to remember how it got there. He got involved in a 3 way pot against Heidi and I shortly before that, and was still steaming that he had folded the eventual winner A4. This “semi-tilt”, combined with him only having 8 bbs, meant that his shoving range was pretty wide. It was unlikely that he had a big pair, which means I probably had 2 live unders. With 2 live unders, the odds of winning a pot in an all-in are roughly 40%. 9 players left means there was 4500 in antes, plus 3000 from the blinds. My 6000 plus Chris’ 16,000 makes the pot 29,500. So, my 10,000 call is getting nearly 3 to 1. If I fold, I am left with roughly 27 bbs, if I call and lose, I will have about 22 bbs. I am not going to play those 2 size stacks all that differently, so the call doesn’t really impact how I will play the rest of the way. All of this made me extremely comfortable with the call, plus then it would just feed into my table image of being extremely loose, which could be advantageous later. Well, I was right, Chris did not have an overpair, but he was holding what was probably the worst cards I could see outside of that range: [As][5s]. Well, this hand IS called The Luckbox, so the result should be obvious. After spiking the 5 in the window, I hit a 4 on the flop as well. The 4 on the turn gave me a virtual lock, and Chris did not improve J Sorry buddy, but that’s poker. Pretty sure you were super happy to see me flip over my holdings…
Hand 3: Advertising Pays Off
Again, this hand comes from the above mentioned final table. I know have about 80k, blinds are still 1000/2000 with 500 ante.
Molly opens from under the gun to 7500. 2 players fold to me, I look down at [5h][5s]. I take a moment to consider Molly’s opening range. She is a very good player, and she has gotten a TON better over the last 12 months. Prior to that, I feel that she played a little too tight, but I have seen her really open up her game, and now she is a much more difficult opponent. With this knowledge, I consider raising to see if I can get her to define her range. However; I didn’t really want to face a 4 bet shove, and her open meant that I would have to make a larger 3 bet than I would like to lose without seeing the flop. I wanted her to have respect for my holdings though, so I counted out some chips as if to raise, ultimately just making a call. This also allows me to throw the hand away for a relatively low price if another player makes a large 3 bet behind me, or if the flop comes with all high cards. Heidi also flats behind me. This makes me think that she may have an upper middle pair, or possibly AJ/AT suited, hoping to catch a flop. I know that she is good enough to see the same things I do, and probably more, but she is now forced to respect Molly’s open and my call. I also cannot put her on a pair in my range, as since she now has to respect our bets, she is not likely to call feeling almost certain she only has 2 outs. The rest of the table folds. Flop comes [3s][4c][6c] or something similar. I know that it was 346, that 2 of them were clubs, and all the cards were black, but don’t remember the exact ones. Molly opens for 17,500, effectively a pot bet. At this point, I am almost nearly convinced that Molly has an over pair to the board. It was my main concern with her oversized open pre-flop, and she has now continued that line, putting a bet out there that is trying to scare away a big flush draw. This flop is about as good a flop as I can hope for though, without hitting a set. I flop open-ended, and the flop is unlikely to have hit either of my opponents’ ranges. I can’t just call here though as any card that hits the turn, that doesn’t give me the straight, is unlikely to help me define my opponents’ hands. I really can only fold or shove. If I really believe Molly has an overpair, I could fold, but that makes me look weak in future pots. Additionally, if I shove, Molly could think that I hit a set, and fold an overpair such as 99 or 1010. Also, if I shove, this almost certainly causes Heidi behind me to fold unless she has flopped a set. She is facing a large open from the original early position raiser, and an over shove. Regardless of her holdings, folding would be her only option without a super strong hand. I decide to make the shove, and Heidi correctly folds behind me. Molly goes in to the tank, which I completely expected. If she is holding an overpair, before she could let it go, she would want to work out whether I had potentially flopped a set, or if I was just making a move with a flush draw. While I expected the tank, the longer it went on, the less confident I got that she was going to fold her pair. She was starting to think out loud about how the hand had played out, even declaring she was ahead at that point. Upon saying this, it became clear to me that she was going to call with her pair, and I was going to need to hit to win. Eventually, she did make the call saying “I just can’t get you off of holding Q3” (my favorite hand, in case you all forgot) and shows [Ah][4h]! Wow! That hand never entered into my mind as potential holdings for her. I think that the vast majority of players would instantly fold that hand in their head, but probably Hollywood it a little bit before actually folding. But Molly had seen my 24 off suit move earlier, plus my Q3os move at the final table, and the vast amount of times I have played Q3, and she just couldn’t believe that I was holding anything better than just bottom pair. Maybe some of that was wanting to convince herself that she was ahead, but I think it was mostly because of my reputation. She even said that she saw me want to raise pre-flop, which I almost always will do when I am holding Q3, and that was what convinced her at that time. Neither of us improved on the turn or river, and I now had a stack that I could finally play against Rob, one of the most analytically talented poker players around. We eventually got heads-up, and I took it down…once again because I got lucky!
So that’s it for this installment. A little bit of everything: a hero call based on tells, a luckbox move, and getting paid based on reputation. I look forward to reading everyone’s comments. Also, as I mentioned in my last home page post, I do have a 2 hand combination against Kou Vang from the MSPT at Canterbury this year that I can post, if you all would like. These 2 hands allowed me to knock Kou out, and propelled me to the final table. Like the hands above, I remember most of the pertinent information, but I am a little more fuzzy on actual blinds and such. If you would like me to post these hands, let me know in your comments.
2 for 1
So many of you know how I went out at the Seminole Hard Rock Poker Open, but just telling you that I flopped a flush and got called by an over pair with no flush outs isn’t very interesting. So, I am going to lay out how the hand, and the one before it which probably set up my bustout, went down.
51 players left out of 3389 entries, blinds 30/60/10k I have about 5.8 million and the villain had about 3.8 million, we are both top 5 in chips, total 88 million in play, 9 handed table.
I had only been at this table for about an hour, and had only played 2 hands, winning with top set Kings, and top 2 AQ, both going to showdown.
Hand 1:The setup
Folded to me on the button, I have [5d][7s] and raise to 150k This is fairly standard play, well for me anyway, but I have a pretty tight image at the table, and the biggest stack. At this point of the tournament I am trying to just accumulate chips to increase my stack for the final table. I am not concerned with the cash payouts at this point, as I am totally focused on the nearly $300k up top. SB folds, BB who has been fairly aggressive, raises to 500k. Regardless of what he has here, I like his play. I could potentially be raising with anything on the button, trying to take down the blinds, relying on my fairly tight table image. Based on his play to this point, I put him on a fairly wide range as well, but figure that if he has a big hand, and I flop well, I can bust him, thus giving me a final table average stack with 50 people left. I call and the flop comes [4c][9d][6c]. BB leads out 600k. I found this bet slightly curious. I instantly filtered his possible range to big cards, including a pair, or the flush draw. May not have been the best analysis, but it was my read on him. At this point I have to love the flop for my hand. Could I really hope for anything better than being open ended? Here’s where things start to go wrong, I just called. Now, one could argue that this is the right move, try and catch the straight on the turn cheaper than if I raise, but calling doesn’t really give me more information on what my opponent holds. The turn brings [2c]. Ugh. Now if my opponent does have the flush I’m drawing dead. If my opponent does not have the flush yet, he could still play the pot bigger than I want to if he holds a big club. He thinks for a little while before checking. Perfect! I can just check behind and cry call the river if my straight comes without another club, so naturally I bet. Wait, what?!?! His body language told me that he didn’t have the flush, so instead of just playing my hand correctly, I tried to represent a hand I didn’t believe he had. I bet 1.2 million and he instantly shoved. Now it no longer matters what he has as I am losing to everything so I muck.
Hand 2: The pain
Very next hand, I’m now left with 3.5 million, table folds to me in the cutoff, I have [5h][2h]. I already know what you’re thinking, insta muck! Not me my friends. I didn’t build my chip stack by sitting back and waiting for premium hands. Plus I love 5 2 suited. Don’t ask why, just know I really enjoy playing this hand, and when I looked down at it after losing a significant portion of my stack, I felt like I was about to get them all back. I make the same opening raise to 150k, and the same villain, I’m sure now brimming with confidence makes the same raise to 500k from the SB. Two things are now going through my mind. 1: he is over confident from winning the previous hand because he outplayed me (but really I outplayed myself). 2: I think he may actually have a big hand as I had the tight image, I would be unlikely to dance again without having a strong hand myself. So here’s why I love 5 2, if my opponent does have a big hand, and I hit the flop HARD, I am getting paid every time. So I flat. Flop [4h][7h][9h] BINGO! I have to admit, there was a small part of my brain already prepping for the ensuing BOOM tweet 🙂 Villain leads out the same 600k as the last hand, and I insta ship my last 3 million. Part of the reason I insta shipped is I gave him credit for being able to think that the insta ship would look like a flush draw, thereby getting him to call with an overpair. It worked to perfection as the villain insta-called with [10d][10s] perfect! Overpair with no flush outs. Turn [10h], river [9s]PAIN.
So what did this exchange teach me? It taught me that I still have a lot to learn. While the pain of busting out 51st after being top 5 in chips just moments before stings, what was worse is that I knew the proper play (at least in my eyes) for my hand in the first exchange but didn’t follow through. This is a leak in my game that I constantly face, knowing what I want to do, and what I should do, but for some reason I do the opposite.
So that is the first hand analysis for the site! Feel free to make your own comments about the hands below.
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